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Abstract—Dempster-Shafer theory of imprecise probabilities
has proved useful to incorporate both nonspecificity and conflict
uncertainties in an inference mechanism. The traditional Bayesian
approach cannot differentiate between the two, and is unable to
handle non-specific, ambiguous, and conflicting information with-
out making strong assumptions. This paper presents a generaliza-
tion of a recent Bayesian-based method of quantifying information
flow in Dempster-Shafer theory. The generalization concretely
enhances the original method removing all its weaknesses that
are highlighted in this paper. In so many words, our generalized
method can handle any number of secret inputs to a program, it
enables the capturing of an attacker’s beliefs in all kinds of sets
(singleton or not), and it supports a new and precise quantitative
information flow measure whose reported flow results are plausible
in that they are bounded by the size of a program’s secret input,
and can be easily associated with the exhaustive search effort
needed to uncover a program’s secret information, unlike the
results reported by the original metric.
Index Terms—computer security, quantitative information flow,
imprecise probabilities, Dempster-Shafer theory, information the-
ory, uncertainty, inference, program analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of information flow analysis is to enforce limits
on the use of information that apply to all computations that
involve that information. For instance, a confidentiality property
requires that a program with secret inputs should not leak
those inputs into its public outputs. Qualitative information flow
properties, such as non-interference are expensive, impossible,
or rarely satisfied by real programs: generally some flow exists,
and many systems remain secure provided that the amount
of flow is sufficiently small, moreover, designers wish to
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable flows.
Systems often reveal a summary of secret information they
store. The summary contains fewer bits and provides a limit
on the attacker’s inference. For instance, a patient’s report is
released with the disease name covered by a black rectangle.
However, it is not easy to precisely determine how much
information exists in the summary. For instance, if the font
size is uniform on the patient’s report, the width of the black
rectangle might determine the length of the disease name.
Quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis is an approach that
establishes bounds on information that is leaked by a program.
In QIF, confidentiality properties are also expressed, but as
limits on the number of bits that might be revealed from a
program’s execution. A violation is declared if the number of
leaked bits exceeds the policy.
The metric in [1] is based on a new perspective for QIF
analysis. The fundamental idea is to model an attacker’s belief
about a program’s secret input as a probability distribution over
high states. This belief is then revised, using Bayesian updating
techniques, as the attacker interacts with a program’s execution.
It is believed that the work reported in [1] is the first to address
an attacker’s belief in quantifying information flow. This work
was later expanded and appeared in [2]. A number of relevant
results [3], [4] were reported in the sequel; however, the work
in [1], [2] is sufficient as a foundation of our work.
A number of weaknesses can be seen in [2]. First, proba-
bility measures are used for capturing an attacker’s belief and
representing her uncertainty about the true state of a system.
These measures have the finite additivity property that forces
them to act on singleton sets, and makes it difficult to represent
an attacker’s ignorance or contradiction. Moreover, these mea-
sures cannot model attackers who effectually or ineffectually
collaborate with each other. Second, the experiment protocol
between an attacker and a system described in [2] cannot
handle more than one secret input to a program. Third, the QIF
metric advanced in [2] reports counter-intuitive flow quantities
that exceed the size of a program’s secret input, and make
it impossible to determine the space of the exhaustive search
needed to uncover a program’s secret information.
This paper presents a generalization of the method followed
in [2] that is free of all these weaknesses. The generalization
is based on Dempster-Shafer theory of imprecise probabilities
[5], [6] which enables the capturing of an attacker’s beliefs in
all kinds of sets (singleton or not), combining those beliefs, and
revising them to update an attacker’s knowledge about a system.
As part of this generalization, we propose an inference scheme
an attacker uses to update her knowledge from interacting with
a program execution. This scheme can handle any number
of secret inputs to a program. The mathematical toolbox on
beliefs and the inference scheme we posit in this paper support
a new and precise QIF measure whose reported flow results
are bounded by the size of a program’s secret input, and can
be easily associated with the exhaustive search effort needed
to uncover a program’s secret information, unlike the results
reported by the original metric.
A. Relation to Our Earlier Work
In a recent position paper [7], we tackled the inexplicable
results reported by the QIF metric in [2] that exceed the size
of a program’s secret input, and presented a refinement that
bounds those results by a range consistent with the size of a
program’s secret input. The refinement was accomplished under
the original Bayesian settings, and it enabled us to relate the
reported flow results to the exhaustive search effort needed to
uncover a program’s secret information. A reader, interested in
developing a clear picture of the problems the metric in [2] is
fraught with, is strongly referred to [7].
B. Plan of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the methods of representing uncertainty starting
from the coarse-grained frame of discernment, moving to joint
frames, tuples, and tuple sets, and ending with the fine-grained
belief functions. In this section, we rigorously clarify the
limitations of probability measures used in [2]. Section III
concentrates on capturing beliefs using mass functions and the
transformation of these functions into belief functions. Our
mathematical toolbox on beliefs is given in Section IV. It
includes formulas for combining beliefs, conditioning them,
and measuring the divergence between them. In this section,
we give a clear comparison between the poor properties of
Kullback-Leibler divergence measure [8] (the authors’ choice
in [2]), and the appealing ones of Jensen-Shannon divergence
measure [9] (our choice). We further investigate and succeed in
generalizing Jensen-Shannon divergence measure in Dempster-
Shafer theory. Section V presents the language needed in our
experiments. Section VI lifts the syntax and semantics of this
language in order to enable us to write programs source code
in terms of mass functions. Section VII gives the attacker’s
model and then presents an inference scheme an attacker uses
to update her knowledge from interacting with a program
execution. Section VIII experiments with this inference scheme
using various set structures induced by an attacker’s beliefs. Our
informal reasoning and generic observations about experiments’
results are also given in this section. Section IX deals with
quantifying information flow and advances a new and precise
QIF measure whose reported flow results are proved to be
bounded by the size of a program’s secret input, and easily
associated with the exhaustive search effort needed to uncover
a program’s secret information. Sample flow calculations are
also given in this section. The paper concludes in Section X.
C. Novel Contributions
We believe that the work reported herein is the first to address
the use of Dempster-Shafer theory in quantifying information
flow. A number of novel contributions that, to the best of our
knowledge do not appear in the literature, are also seen over
the course of this correspondence. They are the generalization
of Jensen-Shannon divergence measure in Dempster-Shafer
theory, the rules of updating a mass function, and conditioning
it on a Boolean expression, in addition to the lifted imperative
while-language that acts on mass functions. All the uncertainty
computations that appear in this paper are worked out using the
pyuds library [10]; a Python library we developed specifically
for this purpose.
II. REPRESENTING UNCERTAINTY
A. Frame of Discernment
For most representations of uncertainty, the starting point
is a set of possible worlds, states, or elementary outcomes
that an agent considers possible. This set is called a frame
of discernment [11] (a frame for short). For example, in the
crude guessing of commonly used passwords, an agent might
consider the following set possible:
{password, 123456, qwerty, abc123, letmein,monkey, 696969}
The frames dealt with in this paper are given under
the closed-world assumption [5]. For a finite frame W =
{w1, ..., wn}, this means two things:
1) Exclusiveness: The worlds wi in W are mutually exclu-
sive which means that at most one of them is the true
world.
2) Exhaustiveness: The frame W is complete which means
that it contains all the possible worlds.
A state in a program execution is an assignment of a value
to a variable, and a frame is eligible to contain a set of those
assignments. For instance, a Boolean variable a accepts two
possible assignments a → 0 or a → 1. It has two possible
states that we may write as σ = (a → 0) and σ = (a → 1),
and its corresponding frame is Wa = {0, 1}.
B. Joint Frame, Tuple, and Tuple Set
A program execution may accept a number of secret (high)
and nonsecret (low) inputs. For each input, we have a number
of possible states that we should assimilate into an independent
frame. To represent an agent’s uncertainty about these two types
of inputs, we need to define the notions of joint frame, tuple,
and tuple set [12].
Definition 1 (Joint Frame): Let r be a finite universal vari-
able set where for each variable X ∈ r there exists a frame
WX of values that can be assigned to X , and let s ⊆ r be a
variable set. The joint frame on s is defined by the formula:
Ws =
∏
X∈s
WX
Definition 2 (Tuple): Let Ws be a joint frame on s ⊆ r. An
s-tuple is a function of the form x : s→Ws that associates a
value x(X) ∈ Ws with each variable X ∈ s.
Definition 3 (Tuple Set): Let Ws be a joint frame on s ⊆ r.
An s-tuple set is a subset S ⊆ Ws.
Definitions 1-3 allow us to assume two joint frames; a high
joint frame Wh on a high variable set h ⊆ r, and a low joint
frame Wl on a low variable set l ⊆ r, to represent an agent’s
uncertainty about secret and nonsecret inputs respectively. The
overall joint frame Wh∪l on the overall variable set h ∪ l ⊆ r
emerges as the product of these two frames:
Wh =
∏
X∈h
WX ,Wl =
∏
X∈l
WX ,Wh∪l =
∏
X∈h∪l
WX
In the remainder of this correspondence, a frame is always
joint unless we state otherwise. When we refer to a frame, we
write Ws, however we do not say that it is taken on the variable
set s ⊆ r. In addition, states are handled similarly to tuples,
and likewise state sets to tuple sets. When we say the high and
low projections of a state, we mean the projections of that state
to h and l respectively.
C. Belief Functions
A frame is a coarse-grained representation of uncertainty,
since we do not have any means of comparing the likelihood
of two worlds. Belief functions, the cornerstones of Dempster-
Shafer theory [5], [6], offer a fine-grained representation of
uncertainty that is suitable for our work because they are
numeric thus enabling us to quantitatively measure information
flow. They further permit the modeling of the evolution (or
regression) of an agent’s knowledge about a system as more and
more pieces of evidence become available. Additionally, they
admit a programming language semantics, as we will show in
Section VI. Finally, under belief functions, all pairs of worlds
are comparable thus promoting the reasoning of agents and
empowering our analysis.
Although probability measures, the authors’ choice in [2], are
familiar, quantitative, support operations on beliefs, and admit a
programming language semantics, they have the finite additivity
property that forces them to act on singleton sets. This makes it
difficult to represent ignorance (by assigning a zero probability
to a set in an algebra) and contradiction (by assigning a nonzero
probability to the empty set). It also complicates assigning
probabilities to non-singleton and joint sets. The inability of
agents to capture ignorance, express contradiction, and believe
in non-singleton and joint sets clearly detracts from the depth of
our analysis. In addition, probability measures entail assigning
scalar probabilities to all sets in an algebra, but an agent
may not have sufficient computational power to do that. This
computational inefficiency escalates into a grueling ordeal when
dealing with huge frames. Lastly, probability measures can only
capture independent work, while failing at modeling attackers
who effectually or ineffectually collaborate with each other as
rigorously clarified in Example 1.
Example 1 (Modeling Attackers’ Collaboration): Consider
a band of attackers whose purpose is to hack into a computer
system. Assume that this band is partitioned into sub-bands
A1, A2,..., An and let µ(Ai) be the degree of infiltration
begotten by the sub-band Ai. For any two sub-bands Ai and
Aj , it is intuitive that any of the following can happen:
• µ(Ai ∪ Aj) = µ(Ai) + µ(Aj) when Ai and Aj work
independently.
• µ(Ai∪Aj) > µ(Ai)+µ(Aj) when Ai and Aj effectually
collaborate.
• µ(Ai∪Aj) < µ(Ai)+µ(Aj) when Ai and Aj ineffectually
collaborate.
III. CAPTURING BELIEF
A belief is a psychological state in which an agent has a
degree of support to a proposition about a system. A belief is
based on a piece of evidence an agent obtains through some
mean. In the framework of Dempster-Shafer theory, this belief
is captured using a mass function, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Mass Function): Let Ws be a frame. A mass
function on Ws is a function of the form m : P(Ws) → [0, 1]
where P(Ws) is the first-order power set of Ws defined as
P(Ws) = {X |X ⊆ Ws}. This function satisfies:
m(∅) = 0,
∑
A∈P(Ws)
m(A) = 1
For any A ∈ P(Ws), the value m(A) has the following
meaning; it characterizes the degree of belief that the true world
is in the tuple set A, but it does not take into account any
additional evidence for the various subsets of A.
Each tuple set X ∈ P(Ws) such that m(X) > 0 is called a
focal set of m. We denote the set of all focal sets induced by
m as Fm, and write:
Fm = {X ∈ P(Ws)|m(X) > 0}
We call the pair 〈Fm,m〉 a body of evidence. Occasionally,
we denote the domain P(Ws) of m as d(m). Definition 5 shows
how to project a mass function.
Definition 5 (Mass Function Projection): Let Ws be a
frame, m : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a mass function on Ws, and
t ⊆ s be a variable set. The projection of m to t is defined for
any A ∈ P(Wt) by the formula:
m↓t(A) =
∑
B↓t=A
m(B)
where B↓t is the projection of the tuple set B ∈ P(Ws) to t.
As a specialization of the general mass function, we define
a point mass function as follows.
Definition 6 (Point Mass Function): Let Ws be a frame, and
m : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a mass function on Ws. We say that
m is a point on the tuple set A ∈ P(Ws), and write m˙A, if
the degree of belief characterized by m is fully concentrated
on A, that is, if m(A) = 1.
Since it does not have the finite additivity property, a mass
function m is not a measure. This can be coped with. One
can bind the pieces of evidence together, and obtain a belief
measure from m using the formula:
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B)
Since the tuple sets in the domain of the function Bel :
P(Ws) → [0, 1] are measurable, normalizing the values
Bel(A), so that the sum is 1, allows us to apply the familiar
distribution arithmetic on them i.e., distribution sum, product,
conditioning, and difference [13]. However, this is not what
we want to do. Converting the values m(A) to Bel(A) is
an expensive operation that should be kept to a minimum.
Moreover, dealing with the values m(A) is more tractable
than dealing with Bel(A). Thus, we ought to maintain the
mass function setting in our work and propose the following
arithmetic on beliefs.
IV. ARITHMETIC ON BELIEFS
A. Belief Combination
We combine beliefs using Dempster’s combination rule [14].
Given two pieces of evidence obtained from two independent
sources (we will shortly discuss independence) and expressed
by two mass functions m1 and m2 on the same frame Ws,
Dempster’s combination rule aggregates m1 and m2 to obtain
a combined mass function m1 ⊗m2 which is defined for any
tuple set ∅ 6= A ∈ P(Ws∪s) by the formula:
(m1 ⊗m2)(A) = k.
∑
B∩C=A
m1(B).m2(C) (1)
where:
(m1 ⊗m2)(∅) = 0, k
−1 =
∑
B∩C 6=∅
m1(B).m2(C)
If m1 and m2 are defined on two different frames Ws and
Wt , then the intersection B ∩ C is inapplicable anymore and
is replaced with the natural join operation B ⊲⊳ C [12] as
expressed by the formula, which is defined for any tuple set
∅ 6= A ∈ P(Ws∪t):
(m1 ⊗m2)(A) = k.
∑
B⊲⊳C=A
m1(B).m2(C) (2)
where:
(m1 ⊗m2)(∅) = 0, k
−1 =
∑
B⊲⊳C 6=∅
m1(B).m2(C)
The parameter k in formulas (1) and (2) normalizes m1⊗m2
which has the appeal of explicitly recognizing conflict between
the pieces of evidence an agent gathers about a system [15].
A prerequisite for using Dempster’s combination rule is that
the pieces of evidence are obtained from independent sources.
Intuitively, this means that these pieces are totally unrelated
and that the occurrence of one of them has no influence on the
other [11]. In our work, this is well-justified if the pieces of
evidence are obtained from external sources that are unrelated
to a program execution; however, it is not if the pieces are
obtained by monitoring an execution - in repeated executions,
an agent relies on one output to rearrange the next input and
thus influence the next output [2].
Dempster’s combination rule has the distinguishing property
of being commutative and associative [11]. This empowers our
analysis by allowing an agent to choose the combination order
and postpone the combination of a misleading piece of evidence
until more hints about this piece are available.
B. Belief Conditioning
We condition beliefs using Dempster’s conditioning rule
[14]. Suppose that a current agent’s belief is captured using
a mass function m : P(Ws) → [0, 1]. Later on, this agent
obtains a new piece of evidence that the true world is in the
tuple set B ∈ P(Ws). Suppose further that there exists a focal
set C ∈ Fm such that C ∩ B 6= ∅. Dempster’s conditioning
rule enables the agent to incorporate the new evidence and
update her knowledge. This rule transforms m into a new mass
function mB as expressed by the formula, which is defined for
any tuple set ∅ 6= A ∈ P(Ws):
mB(A) =


k.
∑
C∩B=A
m(C) for A 6= ∅
0 for A = ∅
(3)
where:
k−1 =
∑
C∩B 6=∅
m(C)
The parameter k has the effect of normalizing mB(A), and
enjoys the same quality mentioned in the previous section.
C. Belief Divergence
1) Choosing a Divergence Measure: An agent’s belief about
a program’s secret input is modeled as a probability distribution
in [2], and the divergence between two probability distributions
is measured using Kullback-Leibler divergence [8], which is
given in Definition 7.
Definition 7 (Kullback-Leibler Divergence Measure): Let
X be a discrete random variable with alphabet X , and let p1
and p2 be two probability distribution functions on X . The
Kullback-Leibler divergence measure between p1 and p2 is
defined by the formula:
KL(p1, p2) =
∑
x∈X
p1(x) log
p1(x)
p2(x)
Our work necessitates a divergence measure between mass
functions, not between probability distributions. KL divergence
cannot be written in terms of generalizable uncertainty func-
tionals, and thus seems non-generalizable in Dempster-Shafer
theory to act on mass functions. In contrast, Jensen-Shannon
divergence measure [9] has an obvious information-theoretic
interpretation in terms of Shannon uncertainty functional, which
makes it generalizable in Dempster-Shafer theory, in addition
to a number of desirable properties that KL lacks. Before
defining Jensen-Shannon divergence measure, we need to give
a definition for Shannon uncertainty functional.
Definition 8 (Shannon Uncertainty Functional): Let X be a
discrete random variable with alphabet X , and let p be a
probability distribution function on X . The uncertainty about
X is defined by the functional:
S(p) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
Uncertainty is measured in bits if the logarithm is binary.
(Here and hereafter, all logarithms are to the base 2).
Definition 9 (Jensen-Shannon Divergence Measure): Let p1
and p2 be two probability distribution functions. The Jensen-
Shannon divergence measure between p1 and p2 is defined by
the formula:
JS(p1, p2) = 2S(
p1 + p2
2
)− S(p1)− S(p2)
In Table I, we compare between KL and JS divergence
measures. P3 is a salient property that maintains the balance
and computational correctness in the information flow measure
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN KL AND JS DIVERGENCE MEASURES
No Property KL JS
P1 D(p1, p2) ≥ 0 Yes Yes
iff p1(x) 6= p2(x)
P2 D(p1, p2) = 0 Yes Yes
iff p1(x) = p2(x)
P3 D(p1, p2) = D(p2, p1) No Yes
P4 Finiteness (Definement) Not if we have p log p
0
Yes
P5 Upper and lower bounds No, only lower bound Yes
P6 Boundness No Yes, JS ≤ 2
we will advance in Section IX. P4 is important in its own right,
since it enables us to handle all possible belief combinations,
including those where one belief is zero and the other is
positive. The dissatisfaction of P4 in KL drives the authors
of [1] to suggest an admissibility restriction on beliefs whose
ineffectiveness is revealed in our earlier work [7]. We also see
that P6 is appealing to have in our work. Indeed, it decidedly
contributes to the desirable boundness of the flow measure we
will propose in Section IX.
2) Generalizing the Divergence Measure: As we saw in Def-
inition 9, JS is written in terms of S. Therefore, generalizing
JS in Dempster-Shafer theory entails generalizing S in the
same theory. The hunt for a generalization of S in Dempster-
Shafer theory starts by noticing that two types of uncertainty
coexist in this theory:
1) The nonspecificity in our prediction about the true world
in a frame.
2) The conflict between the pieces of evidence expressed by
each mass value.
To measure nonspecificity in Dempster-Shafer theory, we use
generalized Hartley uncertainty functional [15], which is given
in Definition 10.
Definition 10: (Generalized Hartley Uncertainty Functional):
Let m : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a mass function on Ws, and Fm
be the set of all focal sets induced by m. The nonspecificity
uncertainty about the true world in Ws is given by the
functional:
GH(m) =
∑
A∈Fm
m(A)log|A|
To aggregately measure both nonspecificity and conflict
in Dempster-Shafer theory, we use the aggregate uncertainty
functional [15], which is given in Definition 11.
Definition 11 (Aggregate Uncertainty Functional): Let
Bel : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a belief function on Ws. The
aggregate uncertainty about the true world in Ws is given by
the functional:
AU(Bel) = max
PBel
{
−
∑
x∈Ws
p(x) log p(x)
}
where PBel is the set of all probability distribution functions
that dominate Bel by satisfying the following two properties:
1) p(x) ∈ [0, 1] for any x ∈ Ws and
∑
x∈Ws
p(x) = 1
2) Bel(A) ≤ ∑
x∈A
p(x) for any A ∈ P(Ws)
A recursive algorithm for computing AU is given in Ap-
pendix I-A [15]. It can be shown that AU is insensitive to
changes in evidence which makes it ill-suited for capturing the
uncertainty associated with an agent’s beliefs [15]. Therefore,
AU is not what we need in order to generalize JS in Dempster-
Shafer theory. However, If we recall that AU is a total of two
types of uncertainty; nonspecificity and conflict, we can write:
AU(Bel) = GH(m) +GS(m)
Based on this equivalence, we can define the generalized
Shannon uncertainty functional.
Definition 12: (Generalized Shannon Uncertainty Functional):
Let m : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a mass function, and
Bel : P(Ws) → [0, 1] be the corresponding belief function,
both on Ws. The conflict uncertainty about the true world in
Ws is given by the functional:
GS(m) = AU(Bel)−GH(m)
where GH(m) and AU(Bel) are respectively given in Defini-
tions 10 and 11.
Notice in Definition 12 that the insensitivity of AU is
overcome by subtracting GH from it. This makes GS sensitive
to changes in evidence, and allows us to proceed with our novel
generalization of JS in Dempster-Shafer theory.
Definition 13: (Generalized Jensen-Shannon Divergence Measure):
Let m1 and m2 be two mass functions on Ws. The generalized
Jensen-Shannon divergence measure between m1 and m2 is
defined by the formula:
GJS(m1,m2) = 2GS(
m1 +m2
2
)−GS(m1)−GS(m2)
where GS is given in Definition 12.
Now we have to check whether the properties of JS listed
in Table I hold on GJS. We know that for any m, we have
GS(m) ≥ 0, which means that P1 holds on GJS. P2 and P3
obviously hold on GJS. It is known that GH(m) ≤ log |Ws|
and AU(Bel) ≤ log |Ws| for any m and Bel on Ws [15].
This means that GS(m) ≤ log |Ws| and consequently that
GJS(m1,m2) ≤ log |Ws|. Thus, P4 and P6 also hold.
V. LANGUAGE
We use an imperative while-language extended with a proba-
bilistic choice construct. The language is described using rules
that show how expressions and commands are formed, how
expressions are evaluated, and how commands are executed.
A. Syntax
The syntactic sets and the metavariables that range over
them are shown in Table II. The formation rules of arithmetic
and Boolean expressions are standard, and we only give the
formation rules of commands:
c ::= skip|X := a|c0; c1|if b then c0 else c1|while b do c|c0 p[] c1
The probabilistic choice rule c0 p[] c1 executes c0 with a
probability p or c1 with a probability 1− p.
TABLE II
THE SYNTACTIC SETS AND THE METAVARIABLES
Syntactic Set Metavariables
V al: The set of integers N n,m
Bool: The set of truth values {true, false} t
V ar: The set of program variables X ,Y
Aexp: The set of arithmetic expressions a
Bexp: The set of Boolean expressions b
Com: The set of commands c
B. Semantics
Recalling that a state in our scheme is an assignment of a
value to a variable (what we mentioned in Section II-A), and
having introduced the syntactic sets in the previous section, we
can now denote a state as a function of the form σ : V ar →
V al. When we write σ(X) = n or σ(X → n) for X ∈ V ar
and n ∈ V al, we mean that the value of the variable X in
the state σ is n. We might have more than one variable in
a single state, in which case we write σ(X,Y ) = (n,m) or
σ(X → n, Y → m) for X,Y ∈ V ar and n,m ∈ V al. A
notation State is also needed to refer to the set of all possible
states in a program execution. We use the following semantic
functions:
A : Aexp→ (State→ V al)
B : Bexp→ (State→ Bool)
C : Com→ (State→ State)
which enables us to define the following denotation functions:
∀a ∈ Aexp.A[a] : State→ V al
∀b ∈ Bexp.B[b] : State→ Bool
∀c ∈ Com.C[c] : State→ State
Since the semantic functions are known, as well as the range
of metavariables, we condense the denotations and write [a], [b],
and [c] instead of A[a], B[b], and C[c].
The evaluation of arithmetic and Boolean expressions is
standard. As for commands, we note that their execution
changes in program states. Unless the corresponding program
inputs are influenced by an agent, we assume that variables in
all states are initially set to zero, that is ∀X ∈ V ar.σ0(X) = 0.
We also observe that a command execution may terminate in
a final state, or may diverge and never yield a final state (non-
termination). Let us explain the meaning of termination in this
non-lifted semantics.
Definition 14 (Non-lifted Meaning of Termination): For any
c ∈ Com, when we write:
[c]σ′ = λσ ∈ State.σ
we mean that the command c, which began in an input state
σ′, deterministically terminates in an output state σ.
The execution rules of commands are given in Table III. The
notion given in Definition 15 is used in one of those rules.
Definition 15 (State Update): Let σ ∈ State, X ∈ V ar,
and n ∈ V al be a state, a variable, and a value respectively.
The state obtained from σ by changing the value of X to n in
TABLE III
THE EXECUTION RULES OF COMMANDS
[skip]σ ≡ λσ ∈ State.σ
[X := a]σ ≡ λσ ∈ State.σ[X 7→ n] where [a]σ = n
[c0; c1]σ ≡ ([c1] ◦ [c0])σ = λσ ∈ State.[c1]([c0]σ)
[if b then c0 else c1]σ ≡ λσ ∈ State.([b]σ, [c0]σ, [c1]σ)
[while b do c]σ ≡ λσ ∈ State. least fixed point of Γ : State
→ State where Γ(ϕ) = λσ ∈ State.([b]σ, (ϕ ◦ [c])σ, σ)
[c0 p[] c1]σ ≡ λσ ∈ State.p × [c0]σ + (1− p)× [c1]σ
σ is denoted as σ[X 7→ n]. Formally, we write:
σ[X 7→ n](Y ) =
{
n if Y = X
σ(Y ) if Y 6= X
We also make use of the simplifying and colorful notation:
(b, x, x′) =
{
x if b = true
x′ if b = false
VI. LIFTED LANGUAGE
In this section, we lift the language we presented in Section
V in order to act on mass functions. Our lifted language is
the first of its kind to enjoy this property. The upgrade process
involves both the syntax and the semantics.
A. Lifting the Syntax
We need to add one more syntactic set to the sets shown in
Table II, which is what we do in Definition 16.
Definition 16 (The MASS Syntactic Set): Let Wh∪l be a
frame on the overall variable set h ∪ l ⊆ r that contains a
program’s secret and nonsecret inputs. We define the syntactic
set MASS to be the set of all mass functions on Wh∪l, and
we use the metavariables m and m′ to range over MASS.
One more formation rule is also needed for any m ∈MASS,
and it is luckily prescribed in Definition 4.
B. Lifting the Semantics
Assuming input (output) masses, when we write m(σ) = n
for m ∈ MASS, σ ∈ State and n ∈ [0, 1], we mean the
likelihood that σ is to be used as an input (output) state. The
only semantic function we need to lift is the one pertaining
to commands. The lifted command semantic and denotation
functions are defined by the mappings:
C : Com→ (MASS →MASS)
∀c ∈ Com.C[c] : MASS →MASS
The meaning of termination also changes in the lifted se-
mantics as shown in Definition 17.
Definition 17 (Lifted Meaning of Termination): For any c ∈
Com, when we write:
[c]m′ = λm ∈MASS.
∑
σ
m(σ).[c]σ
we mean that the command c, which began in any input state σ′
of d(m′), potentially terminates in any output state σ of d(m).
TABLE IV
THE LIFTED EXECUTION RULES OF COMMANDS
[skip]m ≡ λm ∈MASS.m
[X := a]m ≡ λm ∈MASS.m[X 7→ n] where [a]σ = n
for any σ ∈ d(m)
[c0; c1]m ≡ ([c1] ◦ [c0])m = λm ∈MASS.[c1]([c0]m)
[if b then c0 else c1]m ≡ λm ∈MASS.[c0](m|b) + [c1](m|¬b)
[while b do c]m ≡ λm ∈MASS. least fixed point of Γ : MASS
→MASS where Γ(ϕ) = λm ∈MASS.ϕ([c](m|b)) + (m|¬b)
[c0 p[] c1]m ≡ λm ∈MASS.[c0](p ×m) + [c1]((1 − p)×m)
The sum value to the right-hand side of the previous formula
specifies the likelihood of this termination.
In this context, we also need to give our novel definition of
a mass update.
Definition 18 (Mass Update): Let m ∈ MASS, X ∈ V ar,
and n ∈ V al be a mass function, a variable, and a value
respectively. The mass function obtained from m by changing
the value of X to n in all the states of d(m) is denoted as
m[X 7→ n]. Formally, we achieve that as follows:
1) ∀σ ∈ d(m).σ′ = σ[X 7→ n] ∈ d(m[X 7→ n])
2) m[X 7→ n](σ′) =
{
m(σ) if X ∈ σ′
m(σ′) if X /∈ σ′
The lifted execution rules of commands are given in Table
IV. These rules immediately follow from applying the formulas
in definitions 17 and 18 to the execution rules given in Table
III. Notice in the lifted rules that we are conditioning a mass
function on a Boolean expression. Formula (3) can not do this.
We give a novel adaptation of this formula in Definition 19.
Definition 19 (Boolean Expression Conditioning): Let m :
P(Ws) → [0, 1] be a mass function on Ws, and b ∈ Bexp
be a Boolean expression. The expansion of b to the domain
P(Ws) of m yields the tuple set B ⊆ Ws whose tuples satisfy
b i.e., B = {x ∈ Ws|x ⊢ b}. The conditioning of m on b is
then given by the formula:
mb(A) =


∑
C∩B=A
m(C) for A 6= ∅
0 for A = ∅
Notice that the resulted mass function is unnormalized.
VII. INFERENCE SCHEME
This sections presents an inference scheme an attacker uses
to update her knowledge from interacting with a program
execution. This scheme is a generalization of the experiment
protocol advanced in [2]; however it surpasses that protocol
by handling any number of secret inputs to a program. Before
describing this scheme, we need to give the attacker’s model.
A. Attacker’s Model
The attacker is modeled via the following assumptions:
1) The attacker has a copy of the program’s source code.
2) The program has a number of secret inputs the attacker
does not know and would like to learn.
3) The program executes on a system that does not inten-
tionally collude to leak the secret inputs.
4) The program always terminates and preserves the state
of secret inputs as high.
5) The program executes once per interaction with the
attacker, and in each execution the attacker is allowed
to make only one observation.
6) The attacker can monitor the public output of the program
and adaptively change the input.
7) The attacker knows the frame of each secret input, and
the values of all of the nonsecret inputs.
8) The impossible world is not a true value of any of the
inputs [15]. Therefore, the attacker’s belief is captured via
a normalized mass function, which assigns a zero degree
of belief in the impossible world (the empty set) as we
saw in Definition 4.
B. Scheme Description
At first, the attacker has an initial belief about the true values
of the secret inputs. The extent of this belief is captured using
an initial mass function minit : P(Wh)→ [0, 1]. This function
can either reflect the attacker’s initial total ignorance or her
belief in an initial piece of evidence she obtained through some
mean. In the former case, the attacker knows that the true values
of the secret inputs are in the frame Wh; however, she has
no evidence whatsoever about their location in any subset of
that frame, which gives minit(Wh) = 1 and minit(A) = 0
for any A ∈ P(Wh)\Wh. In the latter case, the degree of
the initial belief distributes (unequally in general) among a
number of sets I1,...,Im ∈ P(Wh) such that minit(I1) = i1 >
0,...,minit(Im) = im > 0, minit(Wh) = 1− i1 − ...− im, and
i1 + ...+ im ≤ 1.
Without relying on monitoring a program execution, the
attacker soon obtains a finite number n of pieces of evidence
(through social engineering say) from n independent sources
(independence was discussed in Section IV-A) about the true
values of the secret inputs. The extent of these n pieces of evi-
dence is captured using n mass functions mi : P(Wh)→ [0, 1]
where i = 1,...,n.
Before experimenting with a program execution, the attacker
ought to combine the mass functions she has using formula
(1). The combination outcome is the attacker’s prebelief mpre,
which describes her belief before interacting with the program:
mpre : P(Wh)→ [0, 1] : mpre(A) = minit ⊗
n⊗
i=1
mi(A)
The system chooses the high projection of the input state
σ↓h ∈ P(Wh) to be the set that contains the true values of the
secret inputs. The corresponding point mass function would be:
m˙h : P(Wh)→ [0, 1] : m˙h(σ
↓h) = 1, m˙h(A) = 0 for any A ∈ P(Wh)\σ
↓h
The attacker chooses the low projection of the input state
σ↓l ∈ P(Wl) with the corresponding point mass function:
m˙l : P(Wl)→ [0, 1] : m˙l(σ↓l) = 1, m˙l(A) = 0 for any A ∈ P(Wl)\σ↓l
The low projection σ↓l represents the attacker’s guesses of
the secret inputs, in addition to the nonsecret inputs. These
guesses are likely to be influenced by the attacker’s prebelief,
in which case, the attacker would choose σ↓l as the set that
has the highest mass according to mpre. However, we do not
impose an influence as such to avoid the loss of generality.
The program’s input becomes the combination m˙h ⊗ m˙l
done using formula (2), since the domains of m˙h and m˙l are
different. The system executes the program which produces a
mass function:
mδ : P(Wh∪l)→ [0, 1] : mδ(A) = [S](m˙h ⊗ m˙l)(A)
This mass function represents many possible output states.
However, since the attacker is allowed to make only one obser-
vation per execution, one state must be chosen randomly. This
random choice is made using a sampling operator Γ that draws
a state σ′ from the domain of mδ with a probability 1/|Fmδ |.
The chosen output state becomes σ′ ∈ Γ(mδ), from which the
attacker observes the low projection o = σ′↓l ∈ P(Wl).
The attacker applies the semantics of the program to the
combination m˙l ⊗ mpre to generate a prediction m
′
δ of the
output mass mδ:
m
′
δ : P(Wh∪l)→ [0, 1] : m
′
δ(A) = [S](m˙l ⊗mpre)(A)
The attacker incorporates any additional information con-
tained in the observation o, she made earlier, by conditioning
m
′
δ on o using formula (3). The result is a new mass func-
tion m′′δ the attacker projects to h to obtain her postbelief
mpost = m
′′↓h
δ , which describes her belief after interacting
with the program.
It is worth pointing out that in repeated executions, the
attacker may choose her postbelief from one execution as a
prebelief to the next. The attacker may even choose a prebelief
that contradicts the pieces of evidence she has. Both choices
are acceptable and add ample expressiveness to our analysis.
VIII. EXPERIMENTING WITH THE INFERENCE SCHEME
Unlike the QIF method used in [2], which can only deal
with singleton focal sets induced by an attacker’s beliefs, our
method is capable of handling all focal set structures. This
includes, in addition to singleton focal sets, focal sets that form
a partition, overlapping, and nested focal sets. Experimenting
with our scheme using singleton sets yields identical results to
those in [2]. We also find it rather similar to experiment using
overlapping or nested sets. Therefore, we experiment with only
partition and nested sets. For the purpose of our experiments,
we reuse the same password checker from [2]. This checker
sets an authentication flag a after checking a stored password
p against a guessed password g supplied by the user.
PWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0
The secret input to this PWC is p while the nonsecret ones
are g and a. The universal variable set is r = {p, g, a} and
the high and low variable sets are h = {p} and l = {g, a}
respectively. For simplicity, p is assumed to be either A, B, or
C. Each conducted experiment involves two runs of interaction
between the attacker and PWC. The real password is assumed
to be A in the first run and C in the second.
TABLE V
THE ATTACKER’S PREBELIEF AND POSTBELIEF IN EXPERIMENT 1
P(Wh) mpre m
′
post m
′′
post
{A} .98 1 0
{B,C} .02 0 1
TABLE VI
AN INTERMEDIATE TABLE FOR COMPUTING m˙h ⊗ m˙l
{(A,A, 0), (B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : 1
{(A,A, 0), (A,A, 1), (A,B, 0), {(A,A, 0)} : 1
(A,B, 1), (A,C, 0), (A,C, 1)} : 1
A. Experiment 1
In this experiment, the focal sets induced by mpre form a
partition as shown in Table V. Notice that the attacker believes
p is overwhelmingly likely to be A, but has a very small chance
(not necessarily equally distributed) to be either B or C.
1) Interaction 1: The system chooses σ↓h = (p → A) and
the attacker chooses σ↓l = (g → A, a→ 0). The corresponding
m˙h and m˙l are given in Section VII-B. The program input
m˙h ⊗ m˙l is determined by applying formula (2). We simplify
this task by performing the intermediate computations shown
in Table VI [12]. The first column in this table contains m˙h
and the top row contains m˙l, both of which extended to the
union variable domain h ∪ l = {p, g, a}. Every internal cell
contains the intersection between the corresponding tuple sets
and the product of the corresponding values. The combination
is finalized by adding the values of all internal cells with equal
tuple set and normalizing by k = 1 to obtain:
m˙h ⊗ m˙l = [{(A,A, 0)} : 1]
Next the semantics of PWC, given in Table IV, is applied:
[PWC](m˙h ⊗ m˙l) = [c0]((m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|b) + [c1]((m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|¬b)
where:
c0 ::= a := 1, c1 ::= a := 0, b ::= p = g,¬b ::= p 6= g (4)
The expansion of b to P(Wh∪l) yields:
B = {(A,A, 0), (A,A, 1), (B,B, 0),
(B,B, 1), (C,C, 0), (C,C, 1)}
(5)
Applying Definition 19 conditioning gives:
(m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|b = [{(A,A, 0)} : 1]
The expansion of ¬b to P(Wh∪l) yields:
¬B = {(A,B, 0), (A,B, 1), (A,C, 0), (A,C, 1),
(B,A, 0), (B,A, 1), (C,A, 0), (C,A, 1),
(B,C, 0), (B,C, 1), (C,B, 0), (C,B, 1)}
(6)
Applying Definition 19 conditioning again gives:
(m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|¬b = [∅ : 1]
Now we apply the mass updates, as described in Definition 18:
[c0]((m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|b) = [{(A,A, 1)} : 1]
[c1]((m˙h ⊗ m˙l)|¬b) = [∅ : 1]
A straightforward addition gives:
[PWC](m˙h ⊗ m˙l) = [{(A,A, 1)} : 1; ∅ : 1]
and a final normalization yields the output mass:
mδ = [PWC](m˙h ⊗ m˙l) = [{(A,A, 1)} : 1]
The only state that can be drawn from d(mδ) is (A,A, 1)
from which the attacker observes the low projection:
σ′ = (p→ A, g → A, a→ 1)
o = σ
′↓l = (g → A, a→ 1)
Next m˙l ⊗mpre is determined by applying formula (2):
m˙l ⊗mpre = [{(A,A, 0)} : .98; {(B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : .02]
The semantics of PWC is now applied to get:
[PWC](m˙l ⊗mpre) = [c0]((m˙l ⊗mpre)|b) + [c1]((m˙l ⊗mpre)|¬b)
where c0, c1, b, and ¬b are the same as in (4). Applying
Definition 19 conditioning with the same (5) and (6) yields:
(m˙l ⊗mpre)|b = [{(A,A, 0)} : .98; ∅ : .02]
(m˙l ⊗mpre)|¬b = [{(B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : .02; ∅ : .98]
The mass updates are now applied to get:
[c0]((m˙l ⊗mpre)|b) = [{(A,A, 1)} : .98; ∅ : .02]
[c1]((m˙l ⊗mpre)|¬b) = [{(B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : .02; ∅ : .98]
A straightforward addition gives:
[PWC](m˙l ⊗mpre) = [{(A,A, 1)} : .98;
{(B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : .02; ∅ : 1]
and a final normalization yields the attacker’s prediction:
m
′
δ = [PWC](m˙l ⊗mpre) = [{(A,A, 1)} : .98;
{(B,A, 0), (C,A, 0)} : .02]
After expanding o to d(m′δ) and obtaining:
O = {(A,A, 1), (B,A, 1), (C,A, 1)}
the attacker conditions using formula (3) to get:
m
′′
δ = m
′
δ|o = [{(A,A, 1)} : 1] where k = 1/.98
A final projection of m′′δ to h yields m
′
post shown in Table V.
2) Interaction 2: Similar computations to those presented in
the previous section yields m′′post, also shown in Table V.
TABLE VII
THE ATTACKER’S PREBELIEF AND POSTBELIEF IN EXPERIMENT 2
P(Wh) mpre m
′
post m
′′
post
{A,B} .98 0 0
{A,B, C} .02 0 0
{A} 0 1 0
{B} 0 0 .98
{B,C} 0 0 .02
3) Reasoning About the Results: If we contemplate the
results in Table V. m′post suggests that the attacker is certain
that p is A, whereas m′′post, suggests that she is certain that
the p is either B or C (with chances that are not necessarily
equal). Comparing m′post with mpre tells that interaction 1
had begotten little change in the attacker’s belief. This little
change corresponds to little update in the attacker’s knowledge
and subsequently to little information flow from PWC. If we
compare m′′post with mpre, we arrive at the converse conclusion
- larger knowledge update and larger flow. Notice also that
m
′
post and m
′′
post are more accurate than mpre since both of
them are nearer to m˙h than it. This accuracy increase results
in informing of the attacker, which is positive information flow.
B. Experiment 2
In this experiment, the focal sets induced by mpre are nested
as shown in Table VII. Notice that the attacker believes p is
overwhelmingly likely to be either A or B, but has a very
small chance to be either A, B, or C (all the chances are not
necessarily equal). The attacker’s postbeliefs m′post and m
′′
post
are shown in the same table.
1) Reasoning About the Results: If we contemplate the
results in Table VII. m′post suggests that the attacker is certain
that p is A, whereas m′′post suggests that she believes p is
overwhelmingly likely to be B but has a very small chance (not
necessarily equally distributed) to be either B or C. Comparing
m
′
post with mpre tells that interaction 1 had begotten large
change in the attacker’s belief (she no longer believes in {B}).
This large change corresponds to large knowledge update and
large flow. Comparing m′′post with mpre yields the converse
conclusion. Notice also that m′post is more accurate than mpre
since it is nearer to m˙h than it. This accuracy increase results
in informing of the attacker, and means positive information
flow. However, we cannot informally claim that m′′post is more
accurate than mpre - they both seem to stand at nearly the
same distance from m˙h (which is a point mass on {C}). This
nearly-constant accuracy reflects near-zero information flow.
C. Generic Observations
We can derive generic and informal observations by putting
the experiments’ results into a wider perspective. If the attacker
has a strong belief that the true value of a secret input is in a
partition (in a set nested in other sets in the body of evidence),
and an interaction with the system confutes her belief, then
the attacker’s strong belief is transferred to that partition’s
complement (those sets’ intersection).
IX. MEASURING INFORMATION FLOW
The approach used in [2] to measure information flow,
which corresponds it to an improvement in the accuracy of
an attacker’s belief, is applicable in our setting. Recall from
Section IV-C2 that GJS(m1,m2) measures the divergence
between m1 and m2. The accuracy of the attacker’s prebelief
mpre is its distance from m˙h, measured as GJS(mpre, m˙h).
Likewise, the accuracy of the attacker’s postbelief mpost is
GJS(mpost, m˙h). We define the amount of information flow
Q as the difference between these two quantities:
Q = GJS(mpre, m˙h)−GJS(mpost, m˙h)
= 2GS(
mpre+m˙h
2 )− 2GS(
mpost+m˙h
2 )
−GS(mpre) +GS(mpost)
Calculating the amount of flow from the experiments con-
ducted in Section VIII yields .020145, .97999, 1.01999, and
.01999 bits respectively [10]. These results are in line with the
informal reasoning made in sections VIII-A3 and VIII-B1.
Unlike the metric proposed in [2], our measure has an
intrinsic absolute range bounded by the size of a program’s
secret input as proved in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Considering both deterministic and probabilistic
programs, and all types of an attacker’s beliefs, and avoiding
the imposition of any admissibility restriction on those beliefs,
the general range of flow reported by Q is:
̺Q = [−η, η]
where η is the size of a program’s secret input in bits.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix I-B.
Additionally, the results reported by our measure are easily
associated with the exhaustive search effort needed to uncover
a program’s secret information. This can be easily shown by
assuming a program with a secret input of size η bits, and an
informing flow of k bits from the same program to an attacker.
The absolute upper bound of Q, given in Theorem 1, tells us
that k ≤ η. Therefore, the space of the exhaustive search [16]
that should be carried out in order to reveal the residual part
η − k bits of the secret input is 2η−k. On the contrary, our
earlier work [7] showed that the exhaustive search space cannot
be established under the metric proposed in [2].
X. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a generalization of the QIF analysis method
proposed in [1], [2]. Our generalization is based on Dempster-
Shafer theory of imprecise probabilities. We uncovered a num-
ber of weaknesses in the original method and showed that they
are eliminated by way of our generalization. Our generalized
method can handle any number of secret inputs to a program,
it enables the capturing of an attacker’s beliefs in all kinds of
sets (singleton or not), and it supports a new and precise QIF
measure whose reported flow results are plausible in that they
are bounded by the size of a program’s secret input, and can
be easily associated with the exhaustive search effort needed
to uncover a program’s secret information, unlike the results
reported by the original metric.
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APPENDIX I
ALGORITHMS AND PROOFS
A. Computing Aggregate Uncertainty
Input: A belief function Bel : P(Ws) → [0, 1] on Ws.
Output: AU(Bel) as given in Definition 11.
1) Find a nonempty set A ∈ P(Ws) such that Bel(A)/|A|
is maximal. If more than one set exist, assume the set
that has the highest cardinality.
2) For any x ∈ A, put p(x) = Bel(A)/|A|.
3) For each B ⊆ Ws − A, put Bel(B) = Bel(B ∪ A) −
Bel(A).
4) Put Ws =Ws −A.
5) If Ws 6= ∅ and Bel(Ws) > 0, go to step 1.
6) If Ws 6= ∅ and Bel(Ws) = 0, put p(x) = 0 for any
x ∈ Ws.
7) Compute AU(Bel) = − ∑
x∈Ws
p(x) log p(x).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
0 ≤ GJS(m1,m2) ≤ log |Ws| = η (from Section IV-C2)
−η ≤ GJS(mpre, m˙h)−GJS(mpost, m˙h) ≤ η
̺Q = [−η, η]
